A diaspora bond is a debt instrument issued by a country -or potentially, a sub-sovereign entity -to raise financing from its diaspora overseas. Israel and India have raised nearly $40 billion US dollar financing using these bonds. Drawing on their experiences, this paper discusses the rationale, the methodology, and the potential for issuing diaspora bonds as instruments for raising external development finance. The Government of Israel has offered a flexible menu of diaspora bonds since 1951 to keep the Jewish diaspora engaged. The Indian authorities, in contrast, have used this instrument to raise financing during times when they had difficulty in accessing international capital markets. In terms of process, the issuers of diaspora bonds were able to bypass U.S. SEC registration in the past. But that is unlikely to continue for long. as U.S. investors are unlikely to be allowed to choose the law and the forum governing bond contracts. Finally, we attempt to identify the factors that facilitate-or constrain-the issuance of diaspora bonds. Having a sizeable diaspora abroad is an important factor, but it is generally easier to sell bonds to first generation diasporas than to subsequent generations. Countries with strong and transparent legal systems for contract enforcement are likely to find it easier to issue such bonds. Absence of civil strife is a plus. While not a pre-requisite, presence of national banks and other institutions in destination countries facilitates the marketing of bonds to the diaspora.
Development Finance via Diaspora Bonds
Track Record and Potential
I. Introduction
The rise of various diasporas and their rising economic status in their adopted countries are fast becoming a source of pride as well as financial resources for developing countries. If seeking remittances is a way of tapping into diaspora income flows on a regular basis, 1 issuance of hard-currency-denominated bonds to the diasporas could be a way of tapping into their wealth/assets accumulated abroad. Of course, some diaspora members could divert remittance flows into buying diaspora bonds.
Diaspora bonds are as yet not a widely used instrument in development finance.
Many developing countries, however, have set up schemes to attract Foreign Currency Deposits (FCDs). 2 While both diaspora bonds and FCDs constitute foreign liabilities from the perspective of developing countries, there are vital differences between the two sources of finance. Diaspora bonds are typically long-dated securities which a country has to redeem only upon maturity. FCDs, in contrast, can be withdrawn at any time. This is certainly true of demand and saving deposits. But even time deposits can be withdrawn at any time by forgoing a portion of accrued interest. Thus, diaspora bonds are a source of foreign financing that is long-term in nature. The proceeds from such bonds can be used to finance investment. FCDs, however, are likely to be much more volatile, certainly in theory and possibly in practice as well. As a result, banks need to hold much larger reserves against their FCD liabilities, thereby reducing their ability to fund investments.
A few developing countries have also issued Islamic bonds that target Islamic rather than any country-specific diaspora. Since Islamic laws (Sharia) forbid paying or receiving interest, these bonds are structured as asset-backed securities of medium-term maturity that give investors a share of profit/loss associated with the proceeds from such The diaspora purchases of bonds issued by their country of origin are likely to be driven by a sense of patriotism and the desire to contribute to the development of the home country. 3 Thus, there is often an element of charity in these investments. The placement of bonds at a premium allows the issuing country to leverage the charity element into a substantially larger flow of capital. Diaspora bonds also provide opportunity to diversify asset composition and improve risk management. In this paper, we examine the Israeli and Indian track records to draw generalized conclusions about the viability of this financial vehicle for other developing countries. In 3 That is why diaspora are willing to pay above market prices for such securities, thereby accepting below market yields. 4 As per the Central Bank of Sri Lanka press release of September 13, 2006, the last issue of SLDBs for $105 million was sold through competitive bidding on September 12, 2006 at an average yield of LIBOR+148.5 basis points. 5 An indirect evidence may be the disconnect between the pricing of Lebanon's government bonds and sovereign creditworthiness.
Section II, we elaborate why issuers would find these bonds interesting and why purchasers would find them attractive. In Sections III and IV, we look deeper into the evolution of diaspora bond issuance by Israel and India, respectively. In Section V, we draw upon these experiences to establish minimum conditions for the issuance of diaspora bonds. We also identify several potential issuers of such bonds in this section.
Finally, we conclude in Section VI with a summary and discussion of future research.
II. Rationale for Diaspora Bonds
Countries are expected to find diaspora bonds an attractive vehicle for securing a stable and cheap source of external finance. Since patriotism is the principal motivation for purchasing diaspora bonds, they are likely to be in demand in fair as well as foul weather. 6 Also, the diaspora is expected to provide a "patriotic" discount in pricing these bonds. The Israeli and to a lesser extent Indian experience is clearly in keeping with this hypothesis. The patriotic discount, which is tantamount to charity, raises an interesting question of why would a country not seek just charitable contributions from their diaspora and thereby escape debt-servicing burden associated with diaspora bonds. While countries do find seeking handouts degrading, the principal reason for their preference for bonds versus charity is that the former raises a lot more money than the latter. In other words, diaspora bonds allow a country to leverage a small amount of charity into a large amount of resources for development. If these resources are invested in productive activities, growth would accelerate and debt-servicing capacity would rise in the borrowing countries.
Yet another factor that might play into the calculus of the diaspora bond-issuing nation is the favorable impact it would have on the country's sovereign credit rating. By making available a reliable source of funding that can be availed in good as well as bad times, the nurturing of the diaspora bond market should improve a country's sovereign credit rating. Israel and India are the only countries that have undertaken a numerically significant amount of diaspora bond issuance. Rating agencies believe that Israel's 6 Indeed, the purchases of bonds issued by Israel's DCI rose during the six-day war. Similarly, India was able to raise funds from its diaspora in the wake of the foreign exchange crisis in 1991 and again following the nuclear explosion in 1998 when the country faced debilitating sanctions from the international community. India's access to funding from its diaspora did not prevent the rating agencies' downgrading of the country's sovereign credit rating in 1998 following the imposition of international sanctions in the wake of the nuclear explosions. Moody's downgraded India from Baa3 to Ba2 in June 1998 and S&P cut the rating to BB from BB+ in October 1998.
But the excellent reception which the Resurgent India Bonds (RIBs) and India Millennium Deposits (IMDs) received in difficult circumstances has raised the relevance of diaspora funding to India's creditworthiness. Unlike Israel, however, India has not made diaspora bonds a regular feature of its foreign financing forays. Instead, diaspora bonds are used as a source of emergency finance. While not explicitly stated, India has tapped this funding source whenever the balance of payments has threatened to run into deficit. The country's ability to do so is now perceived as a plus.
Why would investors find diaspora bonds attractive? Patriotism explains in large part investors purchasing diaspora bonds. The discount from market price at which Israel, India and Lebanon have managed to sell such bonds to their respective diaspora is reflection of the charity implicit in these transactions. Up to the end of the 1980s, Israel's DCI sold bonds with 10 to 20 year maturities to Jewish diaspora in the United States (and Canada to a lesser extent) at a fixed rate of roughly 4% without any reference to changes in U.S. interest rates. U.S. 10-year yields over the same time period averaged 6.8%, implying a significant discount to market. It is only in the 1990s that interest rates paid by the DCI started to rise in the direction of market interest rates.
Beyond patriotism, however, several other factors may also help explain diaspora interest in bonds issued by their country of origin. The principal among these is the opportunity such bonds provides for risk management. The worst-case default risk associated with diaspora bonds is that the issuing country would be unable to make debt service payments in hard currency. But its ability to pay interest and principal in local currency terms is perceived to be much stronger and therein lies the attractiveness of such bonds to diaspora investors. Typically, diaspora investors have current or contingent liabilities in their home country and hence don't mind accumulating assets in local currency. Consequently, they view the risk of receiving debt service in local currency terms with much less trepidation than purely dollar-based investors. The SBI officials we interviewed were quite explicit in stating that the Indian diaspora knew SBI to be rupee rich and hence never questioned its ability to meet all debt service obligations in rupees.
Still other factors supporting purchases of diaspora bonds include the satisfaction that investors reap from contributing to economic growth in their home country. Diaspora bonds offer investors a vehicle to express their desire to do "good" in their country of origin through investment. Finally, diaspora bonds also allow investors the opportunity to diversify their assets away from their adopted country.
III. Israeli Experience
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Comparison of interest rates on fixed-rate DCI bonds versus those on 10-year UST notes shows the large extent of "charity" offered by the Jewish diaspora in purchasing these bonds. Interest rates on DCI fixed-rate bonds averaged about 4% from 1951 to 1989. While the 10-year UST rates were lower than 4% only from 1951 to 1958, they have been higher than 4% since. Of course, as the UST rates kept on rising rapidly in the 1980s and buying DCI bonds at 4% implied steep discounts, demand for the fixedrate issuance waned in favor of floating rate debt. As pointed out earlier, however, the sharp decline in US rates since 2002 re-kindled investor interest in fixed-rate DCI bonds.
Note that the degree of patriotic discount has dwindled in recent years and rates on fixedrate DCI bonds have exceeded 10-year UST yields. This is perhaps owed to the fact that younger Jewish investors who are seeking market-based returns are increasingly outnumbering investors with direct or indirect connection to the Holocaust. But perhaps more importantly, the decline in patriotic discount is also due to the Ministry of Finance developing alternative sources of external financing such as negotiable bonds guaranteed by the U.S. Government, non-guaranteed negotiable bonds and loans from banks. These instruments, which trade in the secondary market, provide alternative avenues for acquiring exposure to Israel. Consequently, interest rates on DCI bonds have to be competitive; in fact a tad higher than those on the above alternative instruments given that DCI bonds are non-negotiable. 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 Fixed rate
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The 50 plus year history of DCI bond issuance reveals that the Israeli government has nurtured this stable source of external finance that has often provided it foreign exchange resources at a discount to the market price. Over the years, the government has expanded the range of instruments available to Jewish diaspora investors. The pricing of these bonds has also recognized the changing nature of the target investor population. In the early years, the DCI sold bonds to diaspora Jewry, principally in the United States, 
IV. Indian Experience
The Indian government has tapped its diaspora base for funding on three separate The RIBs and IMDs had five-year bullet maturity. The issues were done in multiple currencies -USD, GBP and Dm for RIBs and EUR for IMDs. The coupons on the RIB were 7.75% on USD, 8.00% of GBP and 6.25% on DEM. The coupons on IMDs were 8.50% on USD, 7.85% on GBP and 6.85% on EUR. Both bonds were aimed at retail investors as reflected in the $2000 minimum subscription of USD issues and multiples of $1000 thereafter. The Indian diaspora provided no patriotic discount on RIBs and only small one on IMDs. When RIBs were sold in August 1998 to yield 7.75% on U.S. dollar-denominated bonds, the yield on BB-rated U.S. corporate bonds was 7.2%.
There was thus no discount on the RIBs. As for the IMDs, the coupon was 8.5% while the yield on the comparably rated U.S. corporate bonds was 8.9% for a 40bp discount. In any case, Indian diaspora bonds provided much smaller discounts in comparison to
Israel's DCI bonds.
India's diaspora bonds differ from Israel's DCI bonds in several ways. First, Israel views diaspora Jewry as a permanent fountain of external capital, which the DCI has kept engaged by offering a variety of investment vehicles on terms that the market demanded over the years. India, however, has used the diaspora funding only opportunistically.
Currently, the country is awash in international reserves and hence the SBI has no plans to issue bonds to the Indian diaspora. Second, the SBI has not just targeted the Indian diaspora, it has restricted the sales to investors of Indian origin. Israel, in contrast, has not limited the access to only the diaspora Jewry. Finally, while the DCI has registered its offerings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the SBI has opted out of SEC registration. This decision by the SBI raises some interesting questions that we take up below.
From purely economic perspective, the SBI's decision to restrict access to RIBs and IMDs to investors of Indian origin appears a bit odd. Why limit the potential size of the market? First, restricting the RIB and IMD sales to the Indian diaspora may have been 7 We take up this point again in justifying SBI's decision to restrict the access to RIBs and IMDs to investors of Indian origin.
a marketing gimmick introduced in the belief that Indian investors would be more eager to invest in instrument that are available exclusively to them. Second, the SBI perhaps believed that the Indian diaspora would be better investor; i.e., they would show more forbearance in times of crisis than others. In other words, if India encountered a financial crisis, Indian diaspora investors will not push too hard to receive debt servicing in hard currency. Having local currency denominated current and/or contingent liabilities, the Indian diaspora investors might be content to receive debt service in rupees. In addition to the above reasons, however, we also find the KYC (Know Your Customer) reason offered to us by SBI officials quite convincing. The SBI concluded that it knew its Indian diaspora investor base well enough to feel comfortable that the investible funds would be legitimate.
The SBI decision to forego SEC registration of RIBs and IMDs raises several interesting issues. As for the RIBs, India managed to sell them to Indian diaspora retail investors in the United States without registering the instrument with the SEC. It made the argument that RIBs were bank certificates of deposits (CDs) and hence came under the purview of U.S. banking rather than U.S. securities laws. Indeed, the offer document described the RIBs as "bank instruments representing foreign currency denominated deposits in India." Like time CDs, the RIBs were to pay the original deposit plus interest at maturity. RIBs were also distributed through commercial banks; there were no underwriters. While the SEC did not quite subscribe to the Indian position, the SBI still sold RIBs to US-based retail investors of Indian origin. But it was unable to do so when it came to the IMDs, which were explicitly called deposits. Still, the SBI chose to forego U.S. SEC registration. But instead of taking on the SEC, the SBI placed IMDs with Indian diaspora in Europe, the Gulf States and the Far East.
Generally, high costs, stringent disclosure requirements and lengthy lead times are cited as the principal deterrents to SEC registration. But these were probably not insurmountable obstacles. Costs of registration could not have exceeded $500K, an insignificant amount compared to large size of the issue and the massive size of the U.S.
investor base of Indian origin to which the registration would provide unfettered access.
The disclosure requirements also should not have been a major constraint for an institution like the SBI, which was already operating in a stringent regulatory Indian banking environment. The relatively long lead-time of up to three months was an issue and weighed on the minds of SBI officials, especially when RIBs were issued in the wake of the nuclear explosions and sanctions. SBI officials also pointed to the plaintiff-friendly U.S. court system in relation to other jurisdictions as the principal reason for eschewing SEC registration. Roberta Romano explains "in addition to class action mechanisms to aggregate individual claims not prevalent in other countries, U.S. procedure -including rules of discovery, pleading requirements, contingent fees, and the absence of a 'loser pays ' cost rule -are far more favorable to plaintiffs than those of foreign courts." Perhaps an argument can be made that investors be allowed to divest themselves from U.S. securities law in their international investments if they so choose. This approach could be generalized by giving investors the choice-of-law and forum, which is a principle recognized by U.S. courts for international transactions. The law and forum would then become another attribute of the security, which will influence its market price. Giving investors the choice-of-law and forum can be supported on efficiency grounds provided that rational and well-informed investors populate the market.
Proposals giving such a choice to investors were floated towards the end of the 1990s (Romano 1998, Choi an Guzman 1998). But markets were roiled since then by the collapse of Enron and MCI, signaling that markets were not always working in the best interest of investors. In view of this, it is highly unlikely that the SEC or the Congress would in the near future relax regulations and permit international investors to opt out of U.S. laws and courts.
Nonetheless, an eventual shift towards a more permissive environment may occur as more and more investors vote with their feet and adopt laws and courts of a country other than the United States. This is already happening. Of the 25 largest stock offerings In the short term, however, countries wishing to raise capital from the diaspora investor will have to register their offerings with the U.S. SEC if they wish to have access to the retail U.S. diaspora investor base. If they opt to eschew SEC registration, they will then lose their ability to sell in the retail U.S. market.
V. Conditions and Candidates for Successful Diaspora Bond Issuance
Israel and India have succeeded in raising funds from their respective diaspora because both nations boast sizable diaspora in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. But for diaspora investors to purchase hard currency bonds issued by their countries of origin, it would seem that there has to be a minimum level governability.
Absence of governability, as reflected in civil strife, is clearly a big negative for diaspora bonds. While this requirement would not disqualify most countries in the Far East and many in Eastern Europe, countries such as Cuba, Haiti and Nigeria (and several others in Africa) which have a large diaspora abroad but have low levels of governability may be found wanting. Israeli and Indian experience also shows that countries will have to register their diaspora bonds with the U.S. SEC if they want to tap the retail U.S. market.
The customary disclosure requirements of SEC registration may prove daunting for some countries. Some of the African and East European countries and Turkey with significant diaspora presence in Europe, however, will be able to raise funds on the continent where the regulatory requirements are relatively less stringent than in the United States.
Arguably, diaspora bonds could also be issued in the major destinations countries in the Gulf region and in Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Russia and South Africa. Docquier and Marfouk (2004) The Israeli track record reveals how the patriotic discount is the greatest from first generation diaspora than from subsequent generations. Thus, the DCI secured large elements of charity in bonds issued in the immediate wake of the birth of the nation. As the Jewish diaspora with intimate connection to the Holocaust dwindled over time, the DCI pricing of diaspora bonds moved closer to the market. This is likely to be even more important where the diaspora ties are based on country of origin rather than religion. The second and subsequent generation country diaspora can be expected to have much weaker ties to their ancestral countries. This suggests that more than the aggregate size of the diaspora, the strength of the first generation immigrants with close ties to the home country would be a better yardstick of the scope for diaspora bonds. Also skilled migrants may have more wealth and ability to invest in diaspora bonds than unskilled migrants.
While not a pre-requisite, the sale of diaspora bonds would be greatly facilitated if the issuing country's institutions such as the DCI from Israel or its banks had a significant presence to service their diaspora in the developed countries of Europe and North America. Such institutions and bank networks would be much better positioned to market diaspora bonds to specific diaspora individuals/communities. Clearly, the presence of Indian banks in the United States helped marketing of RIBs. Where the Indian diaspora was known to favor specific foreign banks, such as the Citibank and HSBC in the Gulf region, the SBI out-sourced the marketing of RIBs and IMDs.
VI. Conclusion
This paper, apparently the first on this topic, discussed the rationale, methodology, and potential for issuing diaspora bonds as instruments for raising external development finance, mostly drawing on the experiences of Israel and India. The
Government of Israel has nurtured this asset class by offering a flexible menu of investment options to keep the Jewish diaspora engaged since 1951. The Indian authorities, in contrast, have used this instrument opportunistically to raise financing during times when they had difficulty in accessing international capital markets (for example, in the aftermath of their nuclear testing in 1998). In terms of process, the issuers of diaspora bonds were able to bypass U.S. SEC registration in the past; but that may not happen in the near future as U.S. investors are unlikely to be allowed to choose the law and the forum governing bond contracts. Finally, factors that facilitate-or constrainthe issuance of diaspora bonds include having a sizeable and wealthy diaspora abroad, and a strong and transparent legal system for contract enforcement at home. Absence of civil strife is a plus. While not a pre-requisite, presence of national banks and other institutions in destination countries facilitates the marketing of bonds to the diaspora.
It has been difficult to gather facts and data on diaspora bonds although anecdotally a number of countries are believed to have issued such bonds in the past (e.g.,
Greece after World War II). One difficulty that confounds data gathering is the confusion between diaspora bonds and foreign currency deposits, and some times between diaspora bonds and local currency deposits. Exhorting the diaspora members to deposit money in domestic banks is different from asking them to purchase foreign currency denominated bonds in international capital markets. Indeed, as we pointed out above, diaspora bonds are also different from Islamic bonds even though both are targeted to investors belonging to a specific group rather than to all investors. There is a need for better data gathering, including on pricing of these bonds, and on the cyclical characteristics of the flows associated with these bonds. There is also a need for clarity on regulations in the host countries that allow or constrain diaspora members from investing in these bonds. A pertinent question in this respect is, should these bonds be non-negotiable or should we make an effort to develop a secondary market for these bonds?
